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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. William Gray, Jr. *
Katherine E. Ramsey **
I. INTRODUCTION
Although meeting in short session, the 2013 Virginia General
Assembly produced an unusually large number of new laws af-
fecting wills, trusts, and estates. Among the nine legislative en-
actments were those that (1) enabled a real property owner to
designate in a revocable deed those who will take the property
upon the owner's death, (2) authorized members of a Virginia lim-
ited liability company to permit the transfer of both their econom-
ic interests and their management interests in the company when
assigning membership, (3) imposed possible criminal penalties on
anyone who financially exploits a mentally incapacitated person,
(4) confirmed and clarified the effect of Virginia's statutory excep-
tion to the Rule Against Perpetuities for personal property,
(5) expanded the category of trustees whose discretionary distri-
bution powers are limited to an ascertainable standard by de-
fault, (6) permitted the personal representative of a deceased mi-
nor child to access the child's online accounts, and (7) required
anyone seeking court permission to exhume a dead body in order
to establish inheritance rights to first cite sufficient facts to es-
tablish a reasonable possibility that the claimed biological rela-
tionship exists. In addition, June 1, 2013 marked the end of a
twelve-month period during which the Supreme Court of Virginia
issued five noteworthy opinions. The Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States rounded out a busy year in the field with an opinion on
June 3, 2013.
* Partner, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1977, University of
Virginia; B.S.I.E., B.A., 1973, Rutgers University.
** Partner, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1998, University, of
Virginia; M.S., 1988, Boston University; B.A., 1986, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University.
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II. LEGISLATION
A. Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act
Virginia law has long permitted individuals to avoid probate by
designating one or more beneficiaries to receive property upon the
owner's death.' While technically Virginia Code section 64.2-620
would seem to permit nontestamentary transfers of any kind of
property, many practitioners have been hesitant to rely on its au-
thority with respect to real estate. The 2013 General Assembly's
enactment of the Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act
(the "Act") resolved this uncertainty and clearly established real
property transfer on death ("TOD") deeds as nontestamentary de-
vices.' TOD deeds therefore promise to become a fixture of estate
planning in the Commonwealth.
The new Act allows a property owner who dies on or after Ju-
ly 1, 2013 to transfer title by a TOD deed, provided the deed
meets the requirements of the statute and is recorded before the
transferor's death in the jurisdiction where the property is locat-
ed.' Such a deed is exempt from recordation taxes unless it was
made for consideration.4 Although the statute expressly validates
a TOD deed executed (and presumably recorded) before the Act's
effective date, the recordation tax exemption would not apply to
such a preenactment deed.'
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-620 (authorizing nonprobate transfers on death); see also id.
§ 6.2-614 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (payment of payable on death bank accounts); id. § 64.2-616
(Repl. Vol. 2012) (ownership of transfer on death securities accounts).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-626 (Supp. 2013); Act of Mar. 14, 2013, ch. 390, 2013 Va.
Acts , - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-621 to -638 (Supp. 2013)). Thirteen other
states have enacted similar statutes, eight of which, like Virginia, follow the model act
promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission ("ULC") in 2009. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY
TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT 1 (2009), available at www.uniformlaws.org/shared/does/real%
20property%20tod/urptodafinaL09.pdf; Legislative Fact Sheet-Real Property Transfer on
Death Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFact Sheet.
aspx?title=Real%20Property%20Transfer%2on%2Death%2OAct (last visited Oct. 15,
2013). Although Virginia did not formally adopt the ULC's Comments, they are instructive
in interpreting the law. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-637 (Supp. 2013).
3. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-622, 64.2-628(3) (Supp. 2013).
4. See id. § 64.2-628(5) (Supp. 2013); id. § 58.1-811(J) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
5. See id. § 64.2-622 (Supp. 2013). Because the Act does not affect any other means of
transferring property under Virginia law, a deed that fails to meet one or more of the stat-
utory requirements for a TOD nevertheless may be effective under the general nonprobate
transfers statute. See id. § 64.2-623 (Supp. 2013).
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To qualify as a TOD deed of Virginia real property, the instru-
ment must contain the essential elements and formalities of a
properly recordable inter vivos deed, except that it must expressly
state that the transfer to the designated beneficiary is to occur at
the transferor's death.6 A TOD deed for property held by tenants
by the entireties or by joint tenants with rights of survivorship
(but not property held by tenants in common) must be executed
by all owners.
The Act includes an optional form TOD deed.' While the form is
helpful in that it restates many key points of the Act such as re-
cordation requirements, revocability procedures, and lifetime ef-
fects, it also exceeds the actual statutory requirements in several
respects and does not include all of the elements of a properly re-
cordable deed.' The drafter therefore is cautioned when using the
form deed to ensure that it also meets any other applicable re-
quirements."o
6. See id. § 64.2-628(1)-(2) (Supp. 2013). It must be recordable pursuant to chapter 6
of title 55, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-106 to -142.15 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013), and is con-
sidered a deed for purposes of determining the authority and duties of the circuit court
clerk. See id. § 64.2-628(4), (7) (Supp. 2013).
7. See id. §§ 64.2-621, -628(6) (Supp. 2013).
8. See id. § 64.2-635 (Supp. 2013).
9. For example, the statutory form of TOD deed includes a notice regarding the need
to record the deed before the owner's death. See id. It also details the manner in which the
owner may revoke the deed. See id. § 64.2-636 (Supp. 2013). While it may be desirable to
include this information as a reminder for those viewing the deed at a later date, it is not
necessary.
10. For example, Virginia Code section 17.1-223(A) requires, inter alia, that the draft-
er's name be included on the first page, that each page be numbered and that the names of
all "grantors" and "grantees" be listed "as required by § 55-48." Id. § 17.1-223(A) (Cum.
Supp. 2013). Section 55-48 in turn requires that the "grantor[s]" and "grantee[s]" be listed
in the first clause of the deed, which the statutory TOD form technically does not do. Id. §
55-48 (Repl. Vol. 2012). Virginia Code section 17.1-223(B) also requires that a deed convey-
ing not more than four residential dwelling units state on the first page (1) the name of
the title insurance underwriter insuring such instrument or a statement that the exist-
ence of title insurance is unknown to the preparer, and (2) that it was prepared by the
owner of the real property or by an attorney licensed to practice law in the Common-
wealth, in which latter case the attorney's statement shall include the preparer's name
and Virginia State Bar number. Id. § 17.1-223 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
As another example, if the owner wishes to execute a TOD deed that will transfer real
property to someone other than the owner's spouse, the spouse should join in the deed to
waive his or her right to include the property in the owner's augmented estate. See id.
§ 55-41 (Repl. Vol. 2012). If the TOD deed will transfer title to a trust upon the owner's
death, it is also advisable to include the trustee's powers in the deed itself so as not to
have to provide a copy of the trust to third parties at a later date. Cf. id. § 55-17.1 (Repl.
Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013).
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Consistent with other probate avoidance techniques, a TOD
deed can be revoked during the transferor's lifetime." Unlike oth-
er methods, however, the TOD deed remains revocable even if it
or another instrument (such as a contract between the parties)
* * 12
contains a contrary provision.
The transferor must use one of two specific methods to revoke a
previously recorded TOD deed in whole or in part. The transferor
must execute either (1) a TOD deed, an inter vivos deed, or an in-
strument of revocation that expressly revokes all or part of the
earlier TOD deed; or (2) a later TOD deed that designates a dif-
ferent beneficiary." Simply destroying or marking the original
TOD is insufficient. 4 The Act includes an optional form of revoca-
tion instrument." The transferor must acknowledge the revoking
document after making the earlier TOD deed, and it must be rec-
orded before the transferor's death." The deed or revocation in-
strument is effective without consideration and without notice or
delivery to, or acceptance by, the designated beneficiary during
the transferor's lifetime."
In the case of a TOD deed executed by multiple transferors,
revocation by one with respect to his or her interest will not affect
the TOD deed as to the interest of another transferor." However,
tenants by the entirety or joint owners with rights of survivorship
may revoke a TOD deed with respect to their joint interest only
by an instrument executed by all of the then living owners."
Like the TOD deed itself, a revocation instrument is not subject
to recordation tax if no consideration passed between the par-
ties." Also, it is important to note that the requirements for re-
voking a TOD deed do not prevent the transferor from actually
conveying title to the property by inter vivos deed to a third par-
ty. 2
11. See id. § 64.2-625 (Supp. 2013).
12. See id.
13. See id. § 64.2-630(A)(1) (Supp. 2013).
14. See id. § 64.2-630(C) (Supp. 2013).
15. See id. § 64.2-636 (Supp. 2013).
16. See id. § 64.2-630(A)(2) (Supp. 2013).
17. See id. § 64.2-629 (Supp. 2013).
18. See id. § 64.2-630(B)(1) (Supp. 2013).
19. See id. § 64.2-630(B)(2) (Supp. 2013).
20. See id. § 58.1-811(J) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
21. See id. §§ 64.2-630(D), -631(1) (Supp. 2013).
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Although a TOD deed is nontestamentary in nature, the capac-
ity required to make or revoke one is the same as the capacity re-
quired to make a will." Unlike a will, however, a TOD deed may
be executed on behalf of an incapacitated person by a duly ap-
pointed agent under a durable power of attorney, provided the
power of attorney expressly empowers the agent to create or
change beneficiary designations."
A TOD deed generally has no effect on the property, the trans-
feror, the beneficiary, or third parties during the transferor's life-
time.24 In the case of tenants by the entirety or joint owners with
rights of survivorship, there is no effect until the death of the last
surviving joint owner.25 Upon the transferor's death (or the death
of the last remaining joint owner), the TOD deed automatically
transfers title to the property, if it is then owned by the transfer-
or, to the designated beneficiary, unless (1) the designated benefi-
ciary did not survive the transferor, or (2) the designated benefi-
ciary is the transferor's former spouse and the TOD deed was
made prior to the transferor's divorce or the annulment of his or
her marriage.2 6 If the TOD deed designates multiple concurrent
beneficiaries, they receive their interests in equal and undivided
shares with no right of survivorship, except that anyone's share
that lapses or fails for any reason is transferred to the others in
proportion to their respective interests.2 7
The foregoing rules are subject to any contrary provision in the
TOD deed itself, the augmented estate, or simultaneous death
and slayer statutes.2 ' A beneficiary also may disclaim all or part
of an interest passing by a TOD deed in accordance with general-
ly applicable Virginia disclaimer rules.
22. See id. § 64.2-627 (Supp. 2013).
23. See UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 9 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 138, 147-48
(Cum. Supp. 2013) ("An individual's agent may execute a transfer on death deed on the
individual's behalf to the extent permitted by other law, such as the Uniform Power of At-
torney Act."). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1622(A)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2012), which includes
beneficiary designations among the "hot powers" that must be expressly granted in a pow-
er of attorney.
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-631 (Supp. 2013).
25. See id. § 64.2-632(C) (Supp. 2013).
26. See id. § 64.2-632(A)(1)-(2), (5) (Supp. 2013).
27. See id. § 64.2-632(A)(3)-(4) (Supp. 2013).
28. See id. § 64.2-632(A) (Supp. 2013).
29. Id. § 64.2-633 (Supp. 2013).
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Even if the TOD deed provides otherwise, the designated bene-
ficiary takes the property (1) without covenant or warranty of ti-
tle, and (2) subject to all conveyances, encumbrances, assign-
ments, contracts, mortgages, liens, and other interests existing at
the transferor's death."o Unless the TOD deed or the transferor's
will provides otherwise, the beneficiary does not have a right of
exoneration, and the property remains subject to the transferor's
creditors' claims, estate administration expenses, funeral and
burial expenses, and statutory allowances to the extent the trans-
feror's probate estate is inadequate for those purposes." If the
transferor transfers more than one property by one or more TOD
deeds, any such liability is apportioned among the properties
based on their net values at the transferor's death." A proceeding
to enforce any such liability against the property must be com-
menced no later than one year after the transferor's death."
While many will likely find the ability to designate a TOD ben-
eficiary for real property useful, personal representatives and
those advising them must now use extra care if the decedent
owned real property. The only way to know if a decedent's real
property interests are part of the probate estate will be to conduct
a title search for each parcel to determine if there is a TOD deed
of record. Even when presented with a duly recorded TOD deed,
the personal representative will need to conduct a search to con-
firm that it was not revoked prior to the decedent's death.
B. Transferability of LLC Interests
In Ott v. Monroe, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a
member of a Virginia limited liability company ("LLC") is dissoci-
ated from the LLC at death and that an assignee, whether desig-
nated by will or other means, is entitled to receive only the former
member's financial interest." The court construed the Virginia
Limited Liability Company Act as flatly prohibiting an assignee
30. See id. § 64.2-632(B), (D) (Supp. 2013).
31. See id. §§ 64.2-531, -634(A) (Supp. 2013).
32. See id. § 64.2-634(B) (Supp. 2013). It would appear this rule is "subject to the
transferor's right to direct the source from which liabilities will be paid," although the
wording leaves room for doubt. Id. § 64.2-634(A) (Supp. 2013).
33. Id. § 64.2-634(C) (Supp. 2013).
34. 282 Va. 403, 410, 719 S.E.2d 309, 312 (2011). For a detailed discussion of the case,
see J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills,
Trusts, and Estates, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 364-67 (2012).
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from participating in the company management, becoming a
member, or exercising membership rights without the consent of
a majority of members, even if the articles of organization or op-
erating agreement purported to permit those actions.3 ' This rul-
ing created a potential trap for the unwary drafter. In response,
the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 13.1-1039
to allow the members of an LLC to provide in the company's arti-
cles of organization or operating agreement that the assignee of a
member's interest will be entitled to participate in the company's
governance, become a member, exercise a member's rights, or en-
joy other economic rights beyond receiving the assignor's share of
profits, losses, and distributions."
C. Financial Abuse of the Mentally Incapacitated
In response to repeated calls for more explicit laws to protect
vulnerable individuals from predatory behavior, the General As-
sembly enacted Virginia Code section 18.2-178.1 to provide crimi-
nal penalties for those who financially exploit mentally incapaci-
tated individuals.
If a person knows, or should know, that another person suffers
from mental incapacity and uses that other person's incapacity to
take, obtain, or convert anything of value belonging to the other
person with the intent to permanently deprive him or her of it,
the person so acting will be guilty of larceny.3" The term "mental
incapacity" means a condition that prevents the affected person
from understanding the nature or consequences of a transaction
or disposition of money or other item of value involved in the of-
fense." To protect agents under valid powers of attorney and
"Good Samaritans," an exception is made for those who acted for
the benefit of the mentally incapacitated person or made a good
35. See Ott, 282 Va. at 409-10, 719 S.E.2d at 312.
36. Act of Apr. 3, 2013, ch. 772, 2013 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1039 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
37. Act of Mar. 16, 2013, chs. 419, 452, 2013 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-178.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-178.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013). The accused may be tried in
any jurisdiction where an act was performed in furtherance of the offense or where the
accused resided at the time of the offense. See id. § 18.2-178.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
39. See id. § 18.2-178.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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faith effort to assist the person with managing his or her money
or other valuables.40
D. Exclusions from Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
Long the bane of every law student's existence, the common
law rule against perpetuities limits the duration of trusts and
property interests."' In 2000, Virginia adopted the Uniform Statu-
tory Rule Against Perpetuities, which modified the common law
rule by providing that an interest in property is void only if (1) at
its creation the interest is uncertain to vest or terminate within
twenty-one years after the death of a life or lives in being, or
(2) the interest does not actually vest or terminate within ninety
years." In a separate bill that same year, the General Assembly
also amended Virginia Code section 55-13.3 to provide generally
that the rule against perpetuities would not apply to any personal
property held in trust if the trust instrument expressly waived
the rule."
Due to the difficulty of enacting two separate bills that dealt
with the same section of the Virginia Code, the resulting opt-out
provision in section 55-13.3 had several technical errors that lim-
ited its usefulness.44 In response, the 2013 General Assembly
amended both Virginia Code sections 55-12.4 and 55-13.3.45 The
40. See id. § 18.2-178.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
41. At common law, a property interest (whether outright or in trust) is valid only if it
must vest within a period of twenty-one years and ten months after some life or lives in
being at the creation of the interest. See Ryland Grp. v. Willis, 229 Va. 459, 463, 331
S.E.2d 399, 402 (1985); Bel-Aire, Inc. v. RB Trexlertown, L.L.C., 68 Va. Cir. 108, 112
(2005) (City of Virginia Beach).
42. Act of Apr. 8, 2000, ch. 714, 2000 Va. Acts 1411, 1411 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-12.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
43. Act of Apr. 8, 2000, ch. 658, 2000 Va. Acts 1261, 1261 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
44. The amended section heading, "Application of the rule against perpetuities to
nondonative transfers," was confusing because the opt-out rule was clearly designed to
apply primarily to donative transfers. Moreover, it was not clear whether a trust's interest
in a corporation, partnership, LLC, business trust, or similar entity that invests in real
estate would be treated as personal property or as an interest in real estate for purposes of
the opt-out rule. The opt-out rule also did not address the situation in which a trustee of a
trust that contained the opt-out language later acquired an interest in real property. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
45. Act of Mar. 13, 2013, ch. 323, 2013 Va. Acts , (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-12.4(A)(8), (B) (Supp. 2013)). The amendments move the opt-out rule from section 55-
13.3 to a more appropriate location in section 55-12.4 ("Exclusions from statutory rule
against perpetuities"). They also confirm that a trust's interest in any entity that owns
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
amended sections confirm that a nonvested interest in, or power
of appointment over, personal property held in trust or a power of
appointment over personal property granted under a trust is not
subject to the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities if the
trust instrument, by its terms, provides that the rule is not to ap-
ply.46 The opt-out applies to the trust's interest in a corporation,
limited liability company, partnership, business trust, or other
entity even if that entity owns an interest in real property; but it
does not extend to any real property held directly by the trust."
Since the changes were considered clarifying rather than sub-
stantive and were related to trusts already in existence, the Gen-
eral Assembly provided that they were declarative of existing
law.48
E. Uniform Trust Code: Ascertainable Standard for Trustee's
Distributions
A trustee who may make discretionary distributions for his or
her own personal benefit or to satisfy his or her personal legal ob-
ligation of support is deemed for federal estate tax purposes to
have a general power of appointment over the part of the trust
that is subject to that discretion. Such a power causes that part
of the trust to be includable in the trustee's gross estate for feder-
al estate tax purposes."o This rule does not apply, however, if the
trustee's discretion is limited by an ascertainable standard."
To avoid inadvertently exposing the trustee's estate to tax on
the trust assets at the trustee's death, Virginia law automatically
limits any such discretionary powers to an ascertainable standard
real estate is considered personal property, not real property, and that the trustee's subse-
quent acquisition of real property does not affect the exempt nature of the portion of the
trust that holds personal property. Id.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12.4(A)(8) (Supp. 2013).
47. Id. § 55-12.4(B) (Supp. 2013).
48. Ch. 323, 2013 Va. Acts at -, cl. 2.
49. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c) (2013).
50. See I.R.C. § 2041(a) (2006).
51. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) (2013). For federal transfer tax purposes, an "as-
certainable standard" is generally one that relates to an individual's "health, education,
support, or maintenance." I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(A), 2514(c)(1) (2006). Virginia law incorpo-
rates this concept into the Uniform Trust Code by reference to those federal tax provisions.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-701 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (defining "ascertainable standard").
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unless the trust instrument expressly declares otherwise. 52 How-
ever, individuals who are not designated as trustees also may risk
estate tax exposure if they are deemed, for tax purposes, to hold
the powers of a trustee." To address the problem, the General As-
sembly expanded the definition of "trustee" in Virginia Code sec-
tion 64.2-776 to include those who are deemed to hold any power
of a trustee, whether because the person has a right to remove or
replace the trustee or because a reciprocal trust or power doctrine
applies.54
F. Access to Minors'Digital Accounts
Amid concern that personal representatives or family members
may be denied access and control of a decedent's online accounts,
the 2013 General Assembly considered the status of such "digital
assets." Its response was a limited bill allowing access to a de-
ceased minor's blogs, e-mail, and other online accounts." The per-
sonal representative of a deceased minor domiciled in Virginia
may now assume the minor's terms of service agreement for a
digital account with an online account service provider for pur-
poses of consenting to and obtaining disclosure of the contents of
communications and subscriber records."
An online account service provider is required to grant access
to a minor's personal representative unless (1) "access is contrary
to the express provisions of a will, trust instrument, power of at-
torney, or court order;" (2) the provider has received notice of a
claim or dispute regarding providing access to the minor's com-
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-776(B) (Supp. 2013).
53. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9235025 (May 29, 1992) (explaining that a trustee who
holds power to make distributions to a beneficiary is deemed to hold a power to benefit
himself if the beneficiary holds an identical power over another trust to benefit the trus-
tee). An individual who can remove and replace a trustee with a related or subordinate
person is treated as having the trustee's distribution powers for federal transfer tax pur-
poses. See Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200531004 (Apr. 21,
2005).
54. Act of Mar. 13, 2013, ch. 324, 2013 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-776 (Supp. 2013)); see examples cited supra note 53.
55. Act of Mar. 14, 2013, ch. 369, 2013 Va. Acts , (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
64.2-109 to -110 (Supp. 2013)).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110(A) (Supp. 2013). "Digital accounts" include "blogging, e-
mail, multimedia, personal, social networking, and other online accounts or comparable
items as technology develops;" but the term does not include bank, brokerage, or other ac-
counts to which a financial institution or its affiliate is a party. Id. § 64.2-109 (Supp.
2013).
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munications and subscriber records, and a final nonappealable
judgment has not yet been entered in the matter; or (3) disclosure
would violate any applicable state or federal law." No one may
maintain an action against an online account service provider for
acting in compliance with the statute.
It remains to be seen how enforceable this new statute will be
given that many providers and their digital account agreements
are not subject to Virginia law.
G. Basis for Exhumation
Issues of blood relationship are often critical in determining the
proper beneficiaries under a will, trust, deed, or other instru-
ment. When someone seeks to establish an out-of-wedlock rela-
tionship through a male family member, exhumation is some-
times necessary for purposes of genetic testing." Prior Virginia
law authorized a court to order the exhumation of a body for ge-
netic testing to prove a biological relationship whenever a plain-
tiff was attempting to prove parentage in accordance with Virgin-
ia Code sections 64.1-5.1 and 64.1-5.2.'0 However, in 2007, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that the statute was directional,
not discretionary, and did not require a plaintiff to show "good
cause" for the requested exhumation." As a result, someone could
seek exhumation merely by claiming to be a descendant of the de-
cedent. This opened the door for an unscrupulous claimant to
threaten exhumation unless the family, wishing to prevent dese-
cration of their relative's grave, "settled" by paying the claimant a
sufficient amount.
The General Assembly eliminated such opportunities for extor-
tion by requiring that before a court may order exhumation, the
party seeking to prove descent from the decedent must set forth
57. Id. § 64.2-110(A)-(C) (Supp. 2013).
58. Id. § 64.2-110(D) (Supp. 2013).
59. Cf. id. § 64.2-102(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (providing that a person born out of wed-
lock is a child of the father if paternity is established, inter alia, by genetic testing).
60. See id. § 32.1-286(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009). In 2012, the Virginia General Assembly
recodified Virginia Code sections 64.1-5.1 and 64.1-5.2 as sections 64.2-102 and 64.2-103,
respectively. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts 1167, 1174 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-102, -103 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
61. Martin v. Howard, 273 Va. 722, 726-27, 643 S.E.2d 229, 231-32 (2007). For a de-
tailed discussion of the case, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 435, 464-65 (2008).
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in a sworn statement sufficient facts to establish "a reasonable
possibility of a biological relationship between the petitioner and
his alleged ancestors."" The statute continues to declare, howev-
er, that substantive proof of parentage is not required to obtain
the exhumation order." The costs of exhumation, testing, and re-
interment usually are to be paid by the petitioner; but the court,
for good cause shown, may order them to be paid from the estate
in which the petitioner is claiming an interest.64
H. Disposition of Unclaimed Bodies
Virginia law has long required "the sheriff or other person or
institution having initial custody of [a] dead body" to make good
faith efforts to identify the next of kin, and any relative or friend
may claim the body for disposition." An unclaimed body may be
used for scientific study or otherwise disposed of if no one claims
it; but the statute set no time period within which a claimant
must appear." The General Assembly amended Virginia Code
section 32.1-288 to specify that the next of kin of a deceased per-
son will have thirty days to claim the body for disposition after
receiving notice of their right to do so.67 It also extended civil lia-
bility protection to any sheriff who accepts a dead body for dispo-
sition, except for any act, decision, or omission resulting from bad
faith or malicious intent.68
Read literally, the amendment may have inadvertently elimi-
nated the ability to dispose of an unclaimed body in cases where
the next of kin cannot be located. Disposition is allowed only after
the next of kin has been given thirty days to claim the body after
notice, but this thirty-day period may never start to run if the
custodian cannot locate the next of kin.
62. Act of Mar. 14, 2013, ch. 370, 2013 Va. Acts, _, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-286(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-286(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
64. Id. As amended, the statute is now consistent with the rules applicable to court-
ordered genetic testing in paternity cases involving a living defendant. See id. § 20-49.3(A)
(Repl. Vol. 2008).
65. Id. § 32.1-288(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
66. See id. § 32.1-288(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
67. Act of Mar. 14, 2013, ch. 373, 2013 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-288(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
68. See id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-288(F) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
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I. Guardians and Conservators: Appointment and Powers
In 2011, the General Assembly enacted the Uniform Adult
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act." By
2013, gaps in the statutory procedure for appointing guardians
and conservators, and in the powers they may exercise, had be-
come apparent. Several were addressed by the 2013 legislature."
A petition for appointment of a guardian or conservator must
now state the basis for the court's jurisdiction and include a copy
of the order appointing any currently serving guardian, commit-
tee, or conservator, if available." A hearing must be conducted
within 120 days after a petition is filed unless the court postpones
it for cause." The court is expressly required to consider the best
interests of the respondent in determining the need for, and pow-
ers and duties of, a guardian or conservator.
The statute continues to allow the parent or guardian of a mi-
nor to petition for appointment of a guardian or conservator no
earlier than six months before the respondent's eighteenth birth-
day, while any other person generally may bring a petition no
earlier than the respondent's eighteenth birthday." However, if
there is no living parent or guardian, the amendment permits any
person to bring a petition up to six months before the respond-
ent's eighteenth birthday, as a living parent could have done."
The court may now order the respondent's estate to reimburse
the petitioner for costs and fees associated with the petition if
(1) the costs and fees are reasonable and (2) the court finds that
the petition was brought in good faith and for the benefit of the
respondent." The court also may order the petitioner to pay some
69. Act of Mar. 25, 2011, ch. 518, 2011 Va. Acts 815, 815 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
37.2-1031 to -1052, recodified as VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-2100 to -2120 by Act of Apr. 4,
2012, ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts 1167).
70. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 18, 2013, ch. 523, 2013 Va. Acts_, (codified as amended
in scattered sections of VA. CODE ANN. tit. 64.2 (Supp. 2013)).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2002(B)(2), (5) (Supp. 2013).
72. Id. § 64.2-2007(B) (Supp. 2013).
73. Id. § 64.2-2007(C) (Supp. 2013).
74. Id. § 64.2-2001(C) (Supp. 2013).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 64.2-2008(A) (Supp. 2013).
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or all of the respondent's costs if it finds that the proceeding was
initiated in bad faith or not for the benefit of the respondent."
Unless the court's order specifically provides otherwise, a con-
servator also may now claim a family allowance, exempt property
allowance, or homestead allowance for the respondent under Vir-
ginia Code section 64.2-313.
The amendment also significantly expands a conservator's es-
tate planning powers by authorizing the conservator to petition
the court for permission to create a revocable or irrevocable trust
on behalf of the incapacitated person with terms approved by the
court, or to transfer assets of the incapacitated person or the in-
capacitated person's estate to a trust for good cause shown." In
determining whether to authorize gifts, disclaimers, or trust
transfers, the court must consider their effect on the incapacitat-
ed person's estate plan." In the case of a trust transfer, it also
must determine whether the trustee should post bond, with or
without surety, or provide an accounting during the incapacitated
person's lifetime."
It is expected these changes will make guardianship and con-
servatorship proceedings more effective, deter abuse, and provide
needed flexibility for the court and conservator to engage in bene-
ficial estate planning where appropriate.
J. Small Estate Act
In addition to the corrections made to the Uniform Adult
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act de-
77. Id.
78. Id. § 64.2-2022(A)(6) (Supp. 2013).
79. Id. § 64.2-2023(A) (Supp. 2013). Notice of a petition to make gifts, disclaim proper-
ty, or create or fund a trust must be given to the incapacitated person and his spouse and
children, all beneficiaries named in any known will, his heirs determined as if he had died
intestate on the date the petition was filed, and all other interested persons, except to the
extent that the court determines that proceeding without notice to any person would not
substantially affect that person. Id. § 64.2-2023(B) (Supp. 2013). If the identities or loca-
tions of any persons are unknown and not reasonably ascertainable, the court may author-
ize them to be represented and bound by another having a substantially identical interest,
to the extent there is no conflict of interests between the representative and the benefi-
ciary. Id.
80. Id. § 64.2-2023(C)(iv) (Supp. 2013).
81. Id. § 64.2-2023(C)(viii) (Supp. 2013).
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scribed above," two other technical amendments were necessary
to clarify the applicability of Virginia's Small Estate Act to credit
union accounts and negotiable instruments. First, the cross-
references found in Virginia Code section 6.2-1367 were updated
to reflect the recodification of title 64.2 in 2012.84 As amended, the
statute confirms that federal credit unions in Virginia are subject
to the Small Estate Act to the extent its terms are not incon-
sistent with applicable federal law." Second, the Small Estate Act
itself was amended to confirm that a designated successor who
presents a proper affidavit may endorse or negotiate a check,
draft, or other negotiable instrument payable to the decedent if
the instrument otherwise qualifies as a small asset.86
K. Effects of Title 64.2 Recodification
Effective October 1, 2012, the Virginia statutes dealing with
wills and estates, fiduciaries, guardians and wards, medical di-
rectives and other health care issues, and other provisions gov-
erning fiduciaries were recodified as title 64.2 and their former
counterparts in other titles of the Virginia Code were repealed."
With such a massive undertaking, it perhaps was expected that a
few statutes would need to be corrected afterward.
Two amendments from 2011, inadvertently omitted from the
recodification, were restored retroactively effective to October 1,
2012." In addition, new Virginia Code section 64.2-108.1 provides
82. See supra Part II.I.
83. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-600 to -605 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013).
84. Act of Mar. 5, 2013, ch. 95, 2013 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.2-1367 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1367 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
86. Act of Mar. 5, 2013, ch. 68, 2013 Va. Acts _, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-601 (Supp. 2013)). This amendment appears to remove any doubt that a
person dealing with a designated successor must comply with this provision if the value of
the entire personal probate estate, wherever located, did not exceed $50,000 at the dece-
dent's death. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-601(A) (Supp. 2013). The person also may choose
to comply regardless of the total estate value if the value of the instrument presented does
not exceed $15,000. See id. § 64.2-602(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
87. See Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts 1167, 1167-1313 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-100 to -2704 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013)).
88. See Act of Apr. 3, 2013, ch. 784, 2013 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-432, -747 (Supp. 2013)). Virginia Code section 64.2-432 (formerly sec-
tion 64.1-62.4) was amended during the 2011 session to address the interpretation of for-
mula clauses and other estate tax-related provisions in a will, trust, or other instrument of
a decedent who died in 2010 in light of the personal representative's ability to elect
whether or not to have the federal estate tax apply to the estate. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch.
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that if a written instrument refers to a section of the Virginia
Code that, at the time the reference is made, has been repealed
and transferred in the same or a modified form to title 64.2, the
instrument will be construed to refer to the new provision in the
absence of any intent to the contrary." The latter amendment, in
particular, should reduce the potential for undesired outcomes
and unnecessary litigation if a drafter inadvertently refers to a
pre-title 64.2 statute in a current document.
III. CASES
A. Effect of Divorce on Federal Insurance Beneficiary
Designations
As described in the authors' 2012 review of Virginia law,
Maretta v. Hillman addressed whether a surviving spouse had an
enforceable claim under Virginia law for an amount equal to the
proceeds of the decedent's federal group life insurance policy,
which were paid to the decedent's former spouse pursuant to a
pre-divorce beneficiary designation.9 0 Virginia Code section 20-
111.1(A) purports to revoke federal insurance beneficiary desig-
nations in favor of a former spouse upon divorce." If the former
679, 2011 Va. Acts 1107, 1107 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-432 (Repl.
Vol. 2012)). Virginia Code section 64.2-747 (formerly section 55-545.05) was also amended
during the 2011 section to protect the assets of certain trusts from the claims of the set-
tlor's creditors or the creditors of a beneficiary holding a withdrawal power. See J. William
Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Es-
tates, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 243, 245 (2011).
89. Act of Mar. 5, 2013, ch. 89, 2013 Va. Acts , _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
64.2-108.1 (Supp. 2013)). The 2012 legislation that enacted new title 64.2 contained a
transitional rule confirming that the repeal of statutory provisions recodified in new title
64.2 would "not affect the validity, enforceability, or legality of any will, trust instrument,
power of attorney, or other instrument or of any fiduciary relationship, or any right estab-
lished or accrued under such instrument or by such relationship, that existed prior to such
repeal." Ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts at 1313, cl. 10. That legislation, however, did not contain a
corresponding provision to interpret a reference to a repealed statute in a document draft-
ed on or after October 1, 2012, the effective date of title 64.2. See, Ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts
1167. Examples include a will or trust that attempts to incorporate fiduciary powers by
reference to repealed section 64.1-57, a durable power of attorney that grants the agent
the powers listed in repealed sections 26-98 through -111, a nonjudicial settlement agree-
ment pursuant to repealed section 55-541.11, a memorandum of tangibles that refers to
repealed section 64.1-45.1, or a statement in lieu of account that recites it is filed pursuant
to repealed section 26-20.1.
90. 283 Va. 34, 37, 722 S.E.2d 32, 33 (2012). For a detailed discussion of Maretta v.
Hillman, see Gray & Ramsey, supra note 34, at 367-69.
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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spouse, not for value, subsequently receives proceeds pursuant to
that designation, section 20-111.1(D) makes the spouse personal-
ly liable for that amount to the person otherwise entitled to the
proceeds under Virginia law.9 2 The latter rule was enacted in
2007 as a legislative response to Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, which held
that federal law preempted certain state laws automatically re-
voking beneficiary designations in favor of a former spouse.9
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded in Maretta
that Virginia domestic relations law could not require a former
spouse, who received insurance proceeds under the decedent's
pre-divorce beneficiary designation, to pay over the benefits to the
person who would be entitled to them under the statute. The
surviving spouse, Mrs. Hillman, was granted a writ of certiorari
by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 11, 2013,
and oral argument was held on Monday, April 22, 2013."
In the meantime, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit issued its decision in Andochick v. Byrd, holding
that an individual named as beneficiary of his ex-wife's retire-
ment benefits could not invoke the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") preemption to avoid a Maryland state
court order requiring him to turn those benefits over to the ex-
wife's estate pursuant to the terms of their property settlement
agreement." The Fourth Circuit found that its decision did not
conflict with Egelhoff because the instant case was a post-
distribution suit that did not interfere with a plan administrator's
ability to pay benefits to the named beneficiary.97
On June 3, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States
weighed in, holding that the Virginia statute was preempted by
federal law." Citing two prior cases dealing with federal statutes
similar to the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of
92. Id. § 20-111.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
93. 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001); Act of Mar. 12, 2007, ch. 306, 2007 Va. Acts 432, 432
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013)). The preempted
statute in Egelhoff was substantially similar to Virginia Code section 20-111.1. See 532
U.S. at 143.
94. Maretta, 283 Va. at 38-39, 722 S.E.2d at 33.
95. Id., cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 11-1221); see also
Hillman v. Maretta, - U.S. -, -, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1943 (2013).
96. 709 F.3d. 296, 297, 301 (4th Cir. 2013).
97. Id. at 301.
98. Hillman, - U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 1947.
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1954 ("FEGLIA") at issue in Maretta," the Court reasoned that
Congress had "spoken with force and clarity in directing that the
proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.""oo The
Court found that section 20-111.1(D) interfered with the employ-
ee's right under FEGLIA to designate a beneficiary, because "it
directs that the proceeds actually 'belong' to someone other than
the named beneficiary by creating a cause of action for their re-
covery by a third party.'0 o
B. Composition of Augmented Estates
The appeal in Tuttle v. Webb considered two issues: (1) whether
a decedent's augmented estate included cash that her husband
had given to her and that she had subsequently given to her son
without her husband's written consent or joinder; and (2) whether
the husband's use of proceeds from their joint loan made him lia-
ble to the wife's estate for more than half of the balance outstand-
ing at her death.10 2
The wife's gift to her son, made within five years of her death,
was includible in her augmented estate unless made with her
husband's "written consent or joinder."' In a suit to determine
the value of the husband's interest in the augmented estate, the
wife's executor pointed out that the gift was made with cash her
husband had previously transferred to her and argued that the
husband's gift check to her was his written consent or joinder to
her subsequent transfer to her son.'o Reiterating its holding in
Chappell v. Perkins, the court rejected that argument.105 A con-
veyance from one spouse to another does not remove the property
from, or decrease the value of, the recipient spouse's augmented
99. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 47 (1981) (addressing the federal Service-
men's Group Life Insurance Act of 1965); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 656 (1950)
(addressing the federal National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940).
100. Hillman, U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting Wissner, 338 U.S. at 658) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 1952 (citing Ridgway, 454 U. S. at 55).
102. 284 Va. 319, 322, 731 S.E.2d 909, 910 (2012).
103. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(A)(3)(d) (Repl. Vol. 2002) (codified as amended at §
64.2-305(A)(3)(d) (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013)); id. § 64.1-16.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2002) (codi-
fied as amended at § 64.2-305(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013)).
104. Tuttle, 284 Va. at 326, 731 S.E.2d at 912.
105. Id. at 326-27, 731 S.E.2d at 912-13; Chappell v. Perkins, 266 Va. 413, 422, 587
S.E.2d 584, 589 (2003).
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estate.'06 The recipient spouse's subsequent gift to a third party
likewise does not remove the property from that spouse's aug-
mented estate unless the non-donor spouse has consented to that
specific gift. 107
The couple were co-makers of a note secured by a deed of trust
on a residence titled in the wife's sole name.' The wife's executor
argued that the husband's augmented estate share should be re-
duced by three fourths of the note balance-one half that he re-
tained in a separate account and half of the other half, which the
couple used to repair the residence.1o' The court, however, looked
not at the uses of loan proceeds but rather at the nature of the ob-
ligation."o As co-makers, the couple were primarily liable, jointly
and severally."' Principles of equity imply a contract between
them to contribute ratably, so each was liable for half of the note
balance."'
C. Assisted Conception: Establishing Parentage
L.F. v. Breit considered whether an unmarried biological father
may use a voluntary written agreement to establish legal parent-
age of his child conceived through assisted conception."'
An unmarried couple conceived a child through in vitro fertili-
zation and executed a written agreement acknowledging the man
as the child's legal and biological father."' The couple separated a
few months after their daughter was born, but the father contin-
ued to provide financial support and to visit consistently on
weekends and holidays until the mother unilaterally terminated
all contact."'
106. Tuttle, 284 Va. at 326, 731 S.E.2d at 912.
107. See id. at 325, 731 S.E.2d at 912.
108. Id. at 323, 731 S.E.2d at 911.
109. Id. at 323-24, 731 S.E.2d at 911.
110. Id. at 327, 731 S.E.2d at 913.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 327-28, 731 S.E.2d at 913-14. The statement of facts indicates that the
husband's augmented estate share may still have been reduced too much due to the note.
In valuing the wife's augmented estate, the lower court included only the net value of the
home. Id. at 323, 731 S.E.2d at 911. To charge his share then for any part of the note bal-
ance appears to be double-counting. That issue, however, was not raised in the appeal.
113. 285 Va. 163, 170-71, 736 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2013).
114. Id. at 171, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
115. Id. at 171-72, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
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In considering the mother's petition to determine parentage,
the court sought to reconcile Virginia Code section 20-49.1, which
allows a biological father and mother to establish paternity by a
voluntary written agreement made under oath, with section 20-
158, which declares that a sperm donor who is not the husband of
the gestational mother is not the parent of a child conceived
through assisted conception."' It sought to read the statutes "as a
consistent and harmonious whole to give effect to the overall
statutory scheme.""'
The court found that the assisted conception statute was writ-
ten to protect married couples from claims of third-party intrud-
ers who served as mere donors."' It noted, however, that the male
in this instance was not merely a donor; rather he was the person
whom the mother chose and intended to be the child's father,
whom she treated as such for an extended period, and whom she
voluntarily acknowledged in a writing she intended to be legally
binding."' Accordingly, the court did not believe that the assisted
conception statute was intended to prevent an unmarried couple
from establishing parental rights to a child they conceived by ar-
tificial means.'20
The court further found that allowing the assisted conception
statute to override the parties' statutorily authorized acknowl-
edgment of paternity would interfere with the father's parent-
child relationship, a constitutionally protected liberty interest."'
Any such interference must be narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling state interest.'22 The mother's reading of the assisted con-
ception statute would absolutely foreclose any legal means for the
father to establish parentage, solely because he was an unmar-
116. Id. at 176-80, 736 S.E.2d at 718-20; see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008
& Cum. Supp. 2013); Id. § 20-158 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
117. Breit, 285 Va. at 178, 736 S.E.2d at 719 (quoting Bowman v. Concepcion, 283 Va.
552, 563, 722 S.E.2d 260, 266 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at 179, 736 S.E.2d at 720.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 179-80, 736 S.E.2d at 720.
121. Id. at 181-82, 736 S.E.2d at 721. The court rejected the father's other constitu-
tional argument-that the assisted conception statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 180-81, 736 S.E.2d at 720-21. Its only gen-
der-based distinction recognizes the fact that men cannot become pregnant, and its dis-
tinction based on marital status furthers the state's significant interest in encouraging the
institution of marriage. Id. at 181, 736 S.E.2d at 720-21.
122. Id. at 182, 736 S.E.2d at 721.
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ried donor. 2 ' The court found no compelling reason why a respon-
sible, involved, unmarried biological parent should be completely
barred from establishing legal parentage of a child born through
assisted conception.124
D. Presumption of Testamentary Capacity
Kiddell v. Labowitz examined the role that the presumption of
testamentary capacity should play in a will contest after the
plaintiff introduces evidence tending to rebut the presumption.'
Three days prior to her death, while hospitalized with a termi-
nal illness and after multiple discussions with her lawyer, the
testator executed a will that would leave her entire estate (except
for her dog) to three charities.'2 6 The lawyer and two paralegals
from his office were present, and all three testified that she un-
derstood the document and the process.'2 7
When the will was admitted to probate, relatives who had been
beneficiaries under an earlier will sought to impeach it on the
ground that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.'28 The trial
court instructed the jury that the testator's proper execution of
the will raised a presumption of testamentary capacity, that the
relatives were required to introduce evidence sufficient to rebut
the presumption, and that, if they did so, the burden rested on
the proponent to prove testamentary capacity by the greater
weight of the evidence.129 The jury ruled in favor of the propo-
nent. 30
On appeal the relatives argued that the presumption of testa-
mentary capacity had disappeared because they had presented
123. Id. at 183, 736 S.E.2d at 722.
124. Id. The mother also argued that acknowledgments of paternity should be unen-
forceable because they serve to bargain away a child's rights. Id. at 184, 736 S.E.2d at
722-23. The court found, however, that children have no purported right or interest in not
having a father. Id., 736 S.E.2d at 723. Rather, it is in a child's best interest to have the
support and involvement of both a mother and a father, even if they are unmarried. Id. at
184-85, 736 S.E.2d at 723.
125. 284 Va. 611, 615, 733 S.E.2d 622, 624 (2012).
126. Id. at 616-17, 733 S.E.2d at 624-25.
127. Id. at 617, 733 S.E.2d at 625.
128. Id. at 616, 733 S.E.2d at 624-25.
129. Id. at 619-20, 733 S.E.2d at 626-27.
130. Id. at 621, 733 S.E.2d at 627.
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evidence to rebut it.'' The court noted, however, that the trial
court specifically declined to rule that their evidence was suffi-
cient for that purpose; instead, it ruled only that the evidence
could potentially rebut the presumption if accepted by the jury as
true and given sufficient weight.'" It declared that a presumption
does not disappear when the other party presents any evidence to
the contrary.' Where the weight of evidence for and against the
presumption is equal, the presumption will prevail.3 4 The jury
must be advised of the presumption so that the proponent is not
deprived of its benefit.'
Three Justices dissented in part, arguing that the presumption
of testamentary capacity disappears when an opponent goes for-
ward with evidence sufficient to rebut it.' They noted, however,
that Virginia decisions provide no standard for determining when
the opponent's evidence is sufficient.' By ultimately concurring
in the result, though, they appear to conclude that the presump-
tion should be applied in the proponent's favor if the evidence is
equally balanced.'
131. Id. In support of the relatives' contention, two doctors testified that the testator
could not have understood what she was signing, and an acquaintance testified that the
testator did not respond appropriately to his questions on the day before she signed the
will. Id. at 618, 733 S.E.2d at 626.
132. Id. at 626-27, 733 S.E.2d at 630.
133. Id. at 627, 733 S.E.2d at 630-31 (quoting Kavanaugh v. Wheeling, 175 Va. 105,
113, 7 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1994)).
134. Id. at 628, 733 S.E.2d at 631.
135. Id. The relatives also argued that the trial court erroneously denied their motion
to strike the proponent's evidence because the proponent had not proved that the testator
knew the natural objects of her bounty when she executed the later will. Id. The court
pointed out that the drafter, the other witness, and the notary all testified that the testa-
tor understood she was executing a will and knew her property, the natural objects of her
bounty, and her wishes for her assets. Id. at 629-30, 733 S.E.2d at 632. In contrast, the
two physician witnesses testified that the testator was not capable of making decisions
about her property at that time. Id. at 630, 733 S.E.2d at 632. The court found that this
conflicting testimony presented a jury issue, so that the trial court did not err in refusing
to strike the proponent's evidence and instead submitting the issue to the jury. Id.
136. Id. at 630-32, 733 S.E.2d at 633 (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) .
137. Id. at 637, 733 S.E.2d at 636 (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
138. See id. at 635-36, 733 S.E.2d at 635-36 (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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E. Definition of "Slayer"
Osman v. Osman considered whether an individual found not
guilty of murder by reason of insanity was nonetheless barred
from sharing in his victim's estate under the slayer statute.13 9
Osman admitted to killing his mother, and her executors re-
quested a declaratory judgment stating that allowing him to in-
herit a portion of her estate would violate public policy.4 o Osman
countered that the slayer statute prevents someone only from
benefiting from an intentional wrongful act and thus did not ap-
ply to him because he, being insane at the time, could not have
formed the intent to commit an unlawful act.14 '
The court noted that one can be declared a slayer upon either
(1) conviction of murder or voluntary manslaughter, or (2) a judi-
cial determination by a preponderance of the evidence that the
person's commission of one of those offenses resulted in the vic-
tim's death.142 The declared purpose of the statute "is to prevent
one who has participated in the willful and unlawful killing of
another from profiting by his wrong."" The court therefore exam-
ined whether the executors had proved the remaining elements of
either murder or voluntary manslaughter by a preponderance of
the evidence."
The court noted that the stipulated evidence in Osman's mur-
der trial clearly demonstrated that he intended to kill his moth-
er.145 He was acquitted by reason of insanity because he lacked
the required criminal intent; but for purposes of the current civil
inquiry, it was sufficient to show that he intended his actions
139. 285 Va. 384, 388-89, 737 S.E.2d 876, 878 (2013).
140. Id. at 388, 737 S.E.2d at 878.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 389-90, 737 S.E.2d at 879 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401 (Repl. Vol. 2007)
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2500 (Repl. Vol. 2012)). In 2012, the Gen-
eral Assembly recodified Virginia Code section 55-401 as section 64.2-2500. Act of Apr. 4,
2012, ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts 1167, 1307 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2500 (Repl. Vol.
2012)).
143. Osman, 285 Va. at 390, 737 S.E.2d at 879 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55-414(A)
(Repl. Vol. 2007), repealed by Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts 1167, 1309 (codi-
fied at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2511 (Repl. Vol. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
2012, the General Assembly recodified Virginia Code section 55-414 as section 64.2-2511.
Ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts 1167, 1309.
144. Osman, 285 Va. at 390-91, 737 S.E.2d at 879.
145. Id. at 392, 737 S.E.2d at 880.
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without showing that he knew they were unlawful.'46 The court
therefore confirmed that the slayer statute applied to deny Os-
man a share of his mother's estate.147
F. Circuit Court's Equity Jurisdiction
Henderson v. Ayres & Hartnett, P.C. considered whether the
circuit court erred in hearing a dispute over funds deposited with
it pursuant to an estate settlement agreement. 4 1
When parties to estate litigation disagreed as to the expenses
to be deducted from property sold pursuant to a settlement, they
had the disputed funds paid into the court for future distribution
as the court determined proper under the settlement agree-
ment.4  The losing party below then questioned the court's au-
thority to decide the issue because it was collateral to the subject
matter of the underlying litigation.'
The court observed that, in an equity case, once a court has ac-
quired actual jurisdiction over all of the parties, or of the res, it
need not send the parties back to a court of law but instead can
146. Id.
147. Id. at 393, 737 S.E.2d at 881. Two justices concurred in the result but questioned
the majority's formulation of the applicable standard when an individual has not been
convicted of murder or manslaughter. They argued that the statute did not change the el-
ements of the offense but instead simply reduced the burden of proof from a criminal to a
civil standard. Id. at 393-94, 737 S.E.2d at 881 (McClanahan, J., concurring); id. at 397,
737 S.E.2d at 883 (Powell, J., concurring). Here, the finding that the defendant was not
guilty by reason of insanity necessarily involved a finding that he had murdered his moth-
er, thus satisfying the requirement for classification as a slayer. Id. at 396-97, 737 S.E.2d
at 883 (McClanahan, J., concurring).
Justice Powell concurred but expressed a concern that, by replacing the mens rea ele-
ment with a civil intent element, the majority inadvertently expanded the definition of
"slayer" to include anyone who intentionally kills another, regardless of the circumstances.
Id. at 398, 737 S.E.2d at 884 (Powell, J., concurring). The majority opinion expressly de-
clined to rule on whether the slayer statute applies to a person who kills in self-defense.
Id. at 393, 737 S.E.2d at 881.
148. 285 Va. 556, 559, 740 S.E.2d 518, 519 (2013).
149. Id. at 559-60, 740 S.E.2d at 519-20.
150. Id. at 562, 740 S.E.2d at 521. The losing party also questioned the court's failure
to grant his request for a jury trial. Id. at 564, 740 S.E.2d at 522. The court observed that
the original cases had been in equity because they were trust and estate disputes and re-
quests for accountings and that, despite the merger of law and equity procedures, historic
distinctions remain. Id. at 564-65, 740 S.E.2d at 522. Among them is the absence of a gen-
eral right to a jury trial in suits in equity. Id. at 565, 740 S.E.2d at 522. Two specific statu-
tory provisions allow jury trials in certain instances, but the appellant had not complied
with their requirements. See id. at 565, 740 S.E.2d at 522 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
336(D), (E) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2013)).
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retain jurisdiction for all purposes, so as to do complete justice be-
tween the parties.15' Here, the parties had agreed to give the court
jurisdiction over the res, the contested funds; accordingly it could
decide their proper distribution.'5 2
IV. CONCLUSION
The short 2013 session of the Virginia General Assembly, while
busy, produced mostly corrective and clarifying measures rather
than significant changes in the law. The most notable exception is
the Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act, which promis-
es to become a very important tool for those seeking to avoid un-
necessary probate. Unfortunately, however, its effective use will
require familiarity with the statute's many technical details.
Even if properly used, transfer on death deeds and revocation in-
struments may make life more difficult for any personal repre-
sentative who qualifies to administer the estate. It will become
necessary to search the title of every parcel the decedent owned to
determine its status. Given this, only time will tell whether the
law proves to be beneficial in fact.
Similarly, the relatively few court decisions issued during the
2012-2013 term were largely non-controversial: the treatment of
joint debt in calculating the augmented estate, the operation of
the presumption of testamentary capacity, the rights of fathers
under the assisted conception statute, the application of the slay-
er statute to those found not guilty by reason of insanity, and the
jurisdiction of the circuit court in equity matters were all clari-
fied. The only decision likely to prompt additional legislative ac-
tion is Maretta v. Hillman, in which the United States Supreme
Court struck down Virginia Code section 20-111.1(D) as unconsti-
tutional. It should therefore be repealed in the next legislative
term.
151. Id. at 563, 740 S.E.2d at 521.
152. Id. at 564, 740 S.E.2d at 522.
2013]1 213
&
